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THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

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ADDITIONAL READING LIST

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All the above are available for reference in the Library, British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y. Those with prices marked may be purchased from the Sales Section.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN *

Introduction

The Sudan comprises a million square miles, and contains about six million inhabitants. The northern boundary was drawn at the 22nd parallel of latitude in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of January 19, 1899, which placed the Sudan under an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. The southern boundary drawn provisionally along a line east to west from Lake Rudolf to the White Nile, divided the Sudan from the British Protectorate of Uganda, and was modified in 1914 by an exchange of territories with Uganda, which gave the Sudan control of the whole stretch of the White Nile navigable from Khartoum. The international frontiers on the east and west were fixed by Treaties with Italy, Ethiopia, Congo Free State (now Belgian Congo) and France. The boundary with Eritrea was fixed by agreements with Italy on December 7, 1898, June 1, 1899, April, 1901, and an Anglo-Italian-Abyssinian agreement of May 15, 1902, which also fixed the Abyssinian frontier. The boundaries with the Congo were arranged in 1906 and 1910. The effective occupation of the territory comprised within these limits was not completed until 1916, with the extension of the Sudan Government's authority over Darfur.

Geographically and culturally the Sudan falls into two parts. North from latitude 12 degrees stretches a country of steppe and desert, part of the great North African-Arabian Desert, inhabited by Hamitic and Arabic-speaking Muslims, and culturally part of the Islamic world; while south is the Sudan proper, inhabited by negroid peoples in a primitive stage of pagan culture, yet linked by tradition and the Nile to the riverain Arabs of the northern area. Many Sudanese are not racially or culturally akin to the Egyptians.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM

Before 1821, the Sudan had little unified history. In 1821, Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, conquered Nubia, Sennar and Kordofan, and founded Khartoum. For 60 years the Sudan was linked with Egypt by Turko-Egyptian Governor-Generals, officials and garrisons, until the revolt of the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed in 1881-85. The occupation of the Sudan by mixed British and Egyptian forces under the command of General Kitchener, following the battle of Omdurman in 1898, was stabilized by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of January 19, 1899, establishing the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. This agreement was signed with the then non-sovereign Egyptian Government and not with the Ottoman Government, the nominal suzerain of Egypt. Egyptian troops led by British officers had taken part in the campaign of 1896-98, but the brunt of the final fighting in 1898 at the battles of Atbara and Omdurman was borne by British units and the Sudanese units of the Egyptian Army under British officers; the total cost of the campaigns

* See also *Relations Between Great Britain and Egypt*, ID 689.

amounted to £2,500,000 sterling (\$12,500,000), to which Britain contributed £800,000 sterling (\$4,000,000). The planning and administrative staffs for the campaign were supplied by Great Britain.

The main terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement were as follows:

- Article 2. The British and Egyptian flags were to be used together in the Sudan;
- Article 3. The supreme military and civil command in the Sudan was vested in the Governor-General appointed by Khedivial decree on the recommendation of the British Government;
- Article 4. The Governor-General to be vested with full legislative powers;
- Article 5. No Egyptian legislation was to apply in the Sudan, unless promulgated by the Governor-General;
- Article 6. Alien residents in the Sudan were not to enjoy special privileges;
- Article 7. There were to be no import duties on goods entering the Sudan from Egypt;
- Article 8. The jurisdiction of the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals was not to extend to or be recognized in the Sudan;
- Article 11. The Slave Trade was prohibited;
- Article 12. The Brussels Act of July, 1890, regarding firearms and the sale of alcoholic liquors was to be stringently enforced.

Under the condominium established by this agreement the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was administered and reconstructed. To this joint work Great Britain contributed the successive Governor-Generals and also the picked body of higher administrative officials and technical and expert services. In addition, a British garrison was maintained at Khartoum. Egypt contributed at first all but the highest grades of public employees, the major portion of the military costs of occupation (till 1924 when Egyptian troops were withdrawn), and an annual contribution to cover the deficits of the Sudan Budget, which ceased in 1940. The cost of naval protection (supply routes, etc.) has been borne by Great Britain, which has also defended Egypt from invasion during two wars.

The British protectorate over Egypt declared in 1914 lasted until 1922, when on February 28 the British Government made a unilateral declaration that it was terminated and Egypt was declared an independent sovereign state. Certain matters were reserved to the discretion of the British Government, and the fourth reservation was the Sudan.

EGYPTIAN CLAIMS IN THE SUDAN

With the emergence of a militant Egyptian Nationalist Movement (Wafd) in 1919 and the declaration of Egyptian independence, the political position in the Sudan changed. From that time onwards Egyptian political leaders of all parties insistently claimed the incorporation of the Sudan in an inde-

pendent Egyptian State, while within the Sudan Egyptian officials and private residents started an anti-British campaign.

The grounds put forward for Egyptian claims to the Sudan were as follows:

1. Egyptian political control 1821-1885;
2. The geographical unity of the Nile Basin as part of a single hydrographical system;
3. On economic grounds, such as the allocation of the Nile Water for irrigation; and as an outlet for Egypt's agricultural population.

During the period of agitation for self-government in Egypt during the early Nineteen-Twenties, difficulties arose in the Sudan with the Egyptian troops, as well as political agitation in Egypt itself.

This led to the issue by Mr. MacDonald, British Prime Minister, of the following statement on October 7, 1924:

"The duty of preserving order in the Sudan rests in fact upon His Majesty's Government and they will take every step necessary for this purpose. Since going there they have contracted heavy moral obligations by the creation of a good system of administration; they cannot allow that to be destroyed; they regard their responsibilities as a trust for the Sudan people; there can be no question of their abandoning the Sudan until their work is done.

"His Majesty's Government have no desire to disturb existing arrangements, but they must point out how intolerable is a 'status quo' which enables both military and civil officers to conspire against civil order, and unless the 'status quo' is accepted and loyally worked until such time as a new arrangement may be reached, the Sudan Government would fail in its duty were it to allow such conditions to continue.

"His Majesty's Government have never failed to recognize that Egypt has certain material interests in the Sudan which must be guaranteed and safeguarded — these being chiefly concerned with her share of the Nile water and the satisfaction of any financial claims which she may have against the Sudan Government. His Majesty's Government have always been prepared to secure these interests in a way satisfactory to Egypt."

On November 19, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar (Commander in Chief) of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, was assassinated in Cairo. Among the demands presented to the Egyptian Government on November 22, was that they should "order within 24 hours the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and the purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army"; at the same time Sudanese units of the Egyptian Army "shall be converted into a Sudan Defence Force, owing allegiance to the Sudan Government alone." The British demands regarding the Sudan were rejected by the Egyptian Government, but the Egyptian forces were withdrawn, and the Sudan Defence Force inaugurated on January 17, 1925.

At the same time, most of the Egyptian officials were retired, and for a period of 12 years Egyptian influence was largely excluded from the Sudan.

This meant that British influence was paramount and that Egypt became practically a sleeping partner in the condominium.

Sudanese Nationalists, a few of whom had at first looked towards Egypt and things Egyptian for their inspiration, now turned towards planning for an independent future in which the Sudan would become a nation independent alike of Egypt and Great Britain.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TO THE SUDAN 1924-1936

The British Government policy towards the Sudan was outlined by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on December 15, 1924. He said in part:

“His Majesty’s Government have a direct responsibility to the people of the Sudan. We are there as trustees. It was owing to our action that the country was reconquered, after it had been lost to Egypt by the Mahdist revolts, following on fifty years of Egyptian misrule and oppression, and when we by agreement admitted Egypt to condominium we at the same time told the Sudan that never again would they go back to the domination of Egypt. We are there as trustees, and we insist that we shall have there for the future, whatever authority is necessary in order to discharge our duty and our responsibilities to the people whom we govern. We have no desire to terminate the condominium.”

Following a series of protracted negotiations with regard to an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, including a draft drawn up in 1930, a coalition Egyptian Government negotiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, signed on August 26, 1936, ratifications being exchanged on December 22, 1936, at Cairo.

THE SUDAN AND THE ALLOCATION OF THE NILE WATERS

The opposition of the Egyptians to the utilization of Nile Water for irrigation in the Sudan was based partly on economic and technical grounds and partly on political. The economic anxiety was due to several factors of comparatively recent occurrence in Egyptian history. The first was that from the early nineteenth century onwards Egyptian agriculture had ceased progressively to be solely dependent upon the Nile flood, and had come to rely in addition upon irrigation from the summer water supply, the volume of which could be easily controlled from the Sudan. The second factor was that since 1898, the upper reaches of the Nile were partially controlled by a Power other than Egypt; and thirdly the development of the Sudanese Cotton Industry (growing a type of cotton similar to Egyptian). A fourth factor was the increase in Egyptian population, with the Sudan as its nearest point of overflow, as Egypt has only a limited arable area.

After the reconquest of the Sudan, the control of the Nile Water above and below Wadi Halfa had been placed in the hands of the Irrigation Service of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. In 1904, a separate Sudan

branch was organized, but it was not until a land survey had been carried out in the Sudan that plans were laid in 1913 for irrigating the Gezira (Jazerah), an area between the Blue and White Niles. A barrage was to be constructed across the Blue Nile in the neighborhood of Sennar to irrigate this area. Owing to the 1914-18 war, the project was delayed until 1919, and actual irrigation did not commence till 1925. This project was limited as to area by agreement with Egypt.

In May, 1921, the Egyptian Government decided to suspend operations on all irrigation works in the Sudan, pending an agreement with Great Britain regarding the political status of the Sudan. In the project for a Sudan Convention placed before the Egyptian Constitution Drafting Commission on May 13, 1922, it was proposed that the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works should be invested with complete control of the Nile Waters, that a Sudan Irrigation Service should be maintained but with only limited powers, that the quota assigned to the Sudan should be distributed by the Egyptian Irrigation Service, that the Gezira scheme should be executed by the same authority, and that the Sudan should draw no water whatsoever from the Nile until Egypt had satisfied her own needs and given her authorization. This never got beyond a draft proposal but was indicative of the policy towards the Sudan likely to be adopted by Egypt if in political control.

After the murder of Sir Lee Stack in November, 1924, point six in the British ultimatum to the Egyptian Government read: "His Majesty's Government therefore require that the Egyptian Government shall: . . . Notify the competent department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated in the Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise."

This was one of the demands rejected by the Egyptian Government, and after an exchange of letters between Ahmed Ziwari Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, and Lord Allenby, the High Commissioner, it was decided not to give effect to this provision but to appoint an expert Committee to consider the irrigation question. This committee met and was on the point of completing its work when the Neutral Chairman, Mr. Cremers (Netherlands) died, and the work was broken off. A departmental Committee was set up which recommended that their report should be accepted. Negotiations dragged on with the Egyptian authorities during 1927-28, the Wafd opposing the settlement of the question, but after an exchange of Notes dated May 7, 1929, with Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha the recommendations of the report were accepted.

The most important clauses of the Nile Waters Agreement were the following:

"(ii). Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would, in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.

"(iv). In case the Egyptian Government decide to construct in the Sudan any works on the river and its branches, or to take

any measures with a view to increasing the water supply for the benefit of Egypt, they will agree beforehand with the local authorities on the measures to be taken for safeguarding local interests. The construction, maintenance, and administration of the above mentioned works shall be under the direct control of the Egyptian Government." (For full text see Cmd. 3348, 1929.)

This agreement removed one of the serious obstacles to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

STATUS OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN UNDER THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF 1936

The status of the Sudan had been one of the main stumbling blocks to the Treaty negotiations. Article 11 embodying the clauses on the Sudan was a compromise but admitted the principle that the primary aim of the administration must be the welfare of the Sudanese.

The text is as follows:

"1. While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future, modifying the agreements of January 19, and July 10, 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be that resulting from the said agreements. The Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said agreements.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese.

Nothing in this article prejudices the question of sovereignty over the Sudan.

"2. Appointments and promotions of officials in the Sudan will in consequence remain vested in the Governor-General, who in making new appointments to posts for which qualified Sudanese are not available, will select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality.

"3. In addition to Sudanese troops, both British and Egyptian troops shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the defense of the Sudan.

"4. Egyptian immigration into the Sudan shall be unrestricted except for reasons of public order and health.

"5. There shall be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters of commerce, immigration, or the possession of property."

An annex to Article 11 arranged that international conventions should only apply to the Sudan by the joint action of the Governments concerned. Article 16 of the Treaty arranged for its duration for 20 years, with negotiations for revision any time after the expiration of 10 years.

ADMINISTRATION IN THE SUDAN

Although the principle was only made explicit in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 "that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese," it has been the governing principle of British administrators since the 1898 occupation.

The Sudan Government began with no settled administration to build on. The 13 years' rule of the Khalifa Abdullah had effectively obliterated all traces of the previous Turko-Egyptian system. It had weakened and destroyed tribal unities and loyalties, and by battle, famine, and plague had reduced the population from eight millions to about three millions. Prompt measures were taken to establish public security, a major factor in this being the ready accessibility of the administrative and judicial staff and the rapid execution of justice.

Under the 1899 Agreement the Governor-General was invested with full legislative powers, which for the first 12 years he exercised upon his own responsibility. In 1910, a Governor-General's Council was constituted and the legislative function became the responsibility of the Governor-General in Council. This Council was composed of officials, four ex-officio members, and five appointed for a term of three years by the Governor-General. In addition, leading Sudanese were called into consultation. In May, 1944, it was decided to set up the Northern Sudan Advisory Council, consisting of 28 ordinary members, with the Governor-General as President, the Civil Secretary, the Financial Secretary, and the Legal Secretary as ex-officio Vice-Presidents. The ordinary members are Sudanese, three from each of the six Arabic-speaking provinces of north, central, eastern and western Sudan. Eight other Sudanese are appointed by the Governor-General "with a view to securing representation on the Council of the more important social and economic interests, including agriculture, education and health." At the end of every three years the ordinary members retire but are eligible for reappointment. The Council has strong provincial representation, most of the members being Nazirs or tribal chiefs with large tribal followings. The Sudanese members have the right of initiative, for any five of them may present a request in writing for a particular subject to be included in the agenda of a session.

The Governor-General's message to the Council in June, 1945, mentioned a twenty-year plan by which it was hoped to fill senior administrative posts in the Government by Sudanese as soon as men of sufficient education, character, and administrative ability could be trained for the posts. No limits have been set to the status of the posts to which the Sudanese may attain and in accordance with the 1936 Treaty the Sudan Government has taken precautions that non-Sudanese should not be appointed to posts for which Sudanese are qualified.

WELFARE SERVICES IN THE SUDAN

"The Sudan Government," said an officer of the Sudan Political Service, "had all the advantages of starting from zero." The foundation of the present system of social services was laid by the military government during the

years immediately after 1898, at a time when even the old tribal organization had practically broken down. The first civilian medical officers were appointed to two towns in 1904. In 1899, the first educational year, there were only 300 boys on the school rolls.

Since then, remarkable advances have been made over the whole field of social services. Today the great majority of the scattered population of the Sudan is within reach of medical help. The Forestry Department has been at work on anti-erosion schemes. The Public Works Department has, especially since 1924, been engaged in the search for new sources of water, and in the west the sinking of new bore-holes has helped to convert many nomadic tribes to settled agriculture.

Education from the beginning had first call on the Sudan's revenues. By 1910, there were 38 elementary schools with an enrollment of 2,000, and four primary schools with 900 pupils. Gordon Memorial College, founded in 1902 as an elementary school, on the initiative of Lord Kitchener who appealed to the British public for funds, had developed by 1940 to the standard of a good English public school. In 1940, over 30,000 boys and girls were attending Government schools, with perhaps another 20,000 in mission and private schools. The annual report of 1902 had stated the immediate aim of the education authorities: "to impart such a knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic to a certain number of young men as will enable them to occupy with advantage the subordinate places in the administration of the country." But in 1940 there were 35 Sudanese in higher administrative posts in Government service, Sudanese judges and advocates in the courts, and a large and increasing majority of Sudanese in all other grades of the civil service, in technical and in engineering posts.

The Gordon College was formally reconstituted in 1945 as a University College, which, it is hoped, will in time rise to the full status of a University. Technical and professional training is available in the Sudan at a Teachers' Training College, at the School of Law in Khartoum, at the Kitchener School of Medicine, at the School of Agriculture at Shambat, at a School of Veterinary Studies, at the Instructional Workshops of the Sudan Railways, at the School of Engineering, and at various other trade and technical schools.

New schools for girls and new classes in the girls training college have been opened. There had been only 344 girls at school in 1924; in 1939, there were at least 3,000 in Government elementary schools alone. A ten-year plan is under way for expanding education as fast as the supply of teachers will allow. A Publications Bureau and an Adult Educational Section have been started as part of a campaign for mass literacy.

Medical services were developed first on the curative side. Seven civil hospitals had been opened by 1901, and, in 1903, 3,357 in-patients and 40,862 out-patients were treated. In 1945, the medical service dealt with 131,571 hospital cases, had 7,897,148 attendances, and performed 15,610 operations. A hospital ship was at work on the upper waters of the White Nile. A system of dispensaries was started in 1924, staffed mainly by graduates of the new Kitchener School of Medicine. Preventive medicine started rather later, with a public health service in each province, concentrating largely on maternity and child welfare and midwifery work. A school for the training of midwives was set up more than 20 years ago. Campaigns against

specific diseases have brought many of the worst epidemic diseases under control and have reduced the worst of the endemic diseases, bilharzia and yaws, to negligible proportions. Sleeping sickness, once a scourge of the Southern Sudan, has been almost eradicated. There were only 39 cases in 1945. Sudanese doctors trained at the Kitchener School, which now offers full six-year courses, are eligible for appointment in the Medical Service, and are debarred from no post in it.

The building of road and rail communications and the development of air transport has done much to make this advance possible. So has the economic advance of the country. The Gezira Cotton Scheme in particular has made revenue available for the financing of public services. This great irrigated cotton-growing area was opened in 1925 as a co-operative undertaking, between the Government, which dug the canals and built the dams, a commercial syndicate, which undertook general management, and the native tenant farmer. In 1939, this undertaking was contributing 25 per cent of the country's total revenue. Notice has now been given that in 1950 the Sudan Government will take over the duties now carried out by the Cotton Syndicates.

Further advance depends on the availability of money and staff, not least of staff trained in the country at the many different training centers.

THE SUDAN'S FUTURE

There are three parties concerned in the question of the future of the Sudan: the Sudanese, the Egyptians and the British.

The Sudanese, consisting of an educated minority and a large illiterate population, and divided racially and culturally into several distinct groups, aim ultimately at self-government. But among those who are politically active — a few thousands out of the population of over 6,000,000 — varying points of view are current as to the means by which this aim should be achieved: whether by a further period of tuition under the condominium, whether by union on terms of equality with Egypt, or whether complete independence should be granted immediately. These points of view are analyzed in two articles by a special correspondent of the London *Times* reproduced in Appendix II.

The attitude of Egypt was expressed as follows by Nokrashy Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, in a statement to the Senate on August 6, 1945: "Regarding the unity of the Nile Valley — Egypt and the Sudan — the principles of the new era justify its realization; particularly since this unity conforms to the wishes of all the people of the Nile Valley."*

In the course of negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which opened on May 9, 1946, the Egyptian Government maintained that any treaty revision must recognize the Sudan as an integral part of Egyptian territory and admit Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan.

The British Government holds the view that the future status of the Sudan must be decided by the Sudanese themselves. It was thus over the question of

* *Cairo Radio*, August 6, 1945.

the Sudan that negotiations for the revision of the Treaty broke down in January, 1947.

On March 26, 1946, before the formal opening of negotiations, the British Foreign Secretary (Mr. Bevin) made the following statement in the House of Commons:

“His Majesty’s Government look forward to the day when the Sudanese will be able finally to decide their political future for themselves. It is not proposed by His Majesty’s Government to influence the eventual decision in any way. His Majesty’s Government have no object in the Sudan other than the true welfare of the Sudanese, and this principle has likewise been proclaimed by the Egyptian Government in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. The welfare of the Sudanese cannot be secured unless stable and disinterested administrations are maintained in the Sudan. The objects of such administration must be to establish organs of self-government as the first step towards eventual independence, to accelerate the process of appointing Sudanese to higher government posts in consultation with Sudanese representatives, and to raise the capacity of the mass of the people for effective citizenship. These are the objects of the present Sudan Government, and His Majesty’s Government fully support them. In the meantime, His Majesty’s Government consider no change should be made in the status of the Sudan as a result of the treaty revision until the Sudanese have been consulted through constitutional channels.”

Further statements on the course of the negotiations, made by the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on January 27, and by the Prime Minister on March 11, 1947, are reproduced in Appendix I.

The Egyptian Government has stated its intention of bringing the matter before the United Nations. Britain will welcome ventilation of the subject, and has nothing to fear from an investigation of the manner in which the Sudan Government has sought to carry out its responsibilities towards the Sudanese. Nor has Britain any intention of ignoring legitimate Egyptian interests in the Sudan, which have been respected in the past and will be respected in any future agreement. But she stands pledged to safeguard the interests of the Sudanese.

A P P E N D I X I

Statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. Ernest Bevin (British Foreign Secretary) on January 27, 1947

I have been informed by the Egyptian Government that they have broken off negotiations for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.

The House will be aware that, when the Egyptian Government requested His Majesty’s Government to enter into negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, His Majesty’s Government, although they were not bound to do so by the terms of the Treaty, willingly acceded to that request.

In May last, His Majesty's Government proposed the withdrawal of all British forces from Egypt, and to settle by negotiation the stages of the evacuation and arrangements for mutual defense to take the place of those embodied in the 1936 Treaty, at the same time making it clear that, in default of the negotiation of a new treaty, the provisions of the Treaty of 1936 would stand. Negotiation in Cairo proceeded slowly until finally in the middle of October the then Egyptian Prime Minister visited this country in an endeavor to settle the major differences which had hitherto stood in the way of agreement. These differences were concerned, first of all, with the obligations of the respective parties in the event of their being the object of attack or, in the event of a threat of war developing in the region of the Middle East, the period within which the withdrawal of British forces and installations from Egypt should be completed, and the question of the Sudan. As a result of the conversations which I had with Sidky Pasha, we were able to reach, on a personal basis and subject to the approval of our respective constitutional organs, full agreement on the texts of a treaty of mutual assistance, an evacuation protocol, and a Sudan protocol. Sidky Pasha undertook to recommend the texts to his Government, and I undertook, for my part, to recommend them to the Cabinet if they were endorsed and put forward to me officially by Egypt.

Of the questions in dispute by far the most difficult was that of the Sudan. My own position in the matter was that I had given a pledge in this House on March 26 last that no change should be made in the status of the Sudan as a result of Treaty revision until the Sudanese had been consulted through constitutional channels. After taking, however, the highest legal advice, I felt that, for the sake of an agreement which would have been as much in the interests of the Sudanese as of either of the other parties, I should be justified in alluding, in the Sudan protocol, to the existence of a symbolic dynastic union between Egypt and the Sudan, provided always that no change was introduced into the existing system of administration, whereby the Sudan is administered by the Governor-General under the powers conferred on him by the 1899 agreements as confirmed and interpreted by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and provided that no change took place in the arrangements under which the defense of the Sudan is assured. The text agreed upon by Sidky Pasha and myself on the above basis read as follows: "The policy which the high contracting parties undertake to follow in the Sudan, within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt, will have for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests, and their active preparation for self-government, and, consequently, the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan. Until the high contracting parties can, in full common agreement, realize this latter objective, after consultation with the Sudanese, the agreement of 1899 will continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936, together with its annex and paragraphs 14 to 16 of the agreed minute annexed to the same Treaty, will remain in force notwithstanding the first article of the present Treaty."

I would draw particular attention to the right assured to the Sudanese by this text to choose the future status of the Sudan. In the course of our discussions this point came up more than once. I, for my part, made it clear

that nothing must be done, and that I must be able to assure the British people that nothing was being done, to prejudice the right of the Sudanese after they had attained self-government ultimately to exercise their choice — a development which it would take some time to realize. Sidky Pasha subscribed to the view that nothing on paper could prejudice the right of independence nor could it bind a people in search of liberty. This, as His Excellency admitted, was a universal principle and not a matter for incorporation in a Treaty. I assumed, therefore, and I had good reason to assume, that agreement existed between us that the Sudanese, when the time came for them to make the choice of their future status, would not be debarred from choosing complete independence, just as they would be free to choose some form of association with Egypt or even complete union with Egypt.

Scarcely, however, had Sidky Pasha left this country than reports appeared, and appeared without contradiction, that His Majesty's Government had conceded the unity of Egypt and the Sudan without the ultimate right of self-determination. This publication gave rise to my right honorable Friend, the Prime Minister's statement on October 28, 1946. It was succeeded by other disclosures and, at later dates, by official utterances which made it clear that in Egyptian eyes the political evolution of the Sudanese must stop short at self-government under the Egyptian Crown and that the status of independence for the Sudan was unthinkable. Nokrashi Pasha, in fact, on assuming office, stated in the Chamber of Deputies that, "when I say unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, I mean a permanent unity." The first effect of these statements was to create a situation of extreme tension in the Sudan where the numerically powerful parties favoring independence accused His Majesty's Government most bitterly of breaking their pledge and of selling them to Egypt. Some rioting took place, but Sir Hubert Huddleston, the Governor-General, thanks to his great influence and to the confidence which he inspires in the Sudan, has been able to allay Sudanese anxiety, to restore confidence in the administration, and to persuade the Sudanese independence groups, who had declared a political boycott, again to collaborate with the organs of the Sudan Government instituted to promote the association of the Sudanese with the Administration. The Governor-General has been the subject of bitter criticism in Egypt, which I deplore and which I regard as unjustified.

But this clearly did not by itself go far enough. I could not, after what had passed, recommend the Sudan protocol to the Cabinet and to Parliament without securing an agreed interpretation of its terms which would not run counter to what the people of this country regard as the natural order of things, viz., that peoples having achieved self-government shall have the ultimate right to self-determination, including a right to independence if they want it. I regret that all my efforts have failed to reach anything in the nature of an agreed interpretation, whether in the form of an exchange of letters or of agreed statements to be made by the spokesman of both sides, or even of agreed statements in which the difference separating the parties would be honestly declared in the hope that it could be composed later, since the question at issue cannot become a live one for at least some years. I offered, in addition, if any of these proposals were adopted, myself to make a public statement to reassure Egypt as regards the aims of British policy in the Sudan.

I have offered every guarantee for the safeguard of Egyptian interests in the Sudan — for no one realizes more clearly than His Majesty's Government how vital, for instance, is Egyptian interest in the waters of the Nile — I have offered to sign the treaty of mutual assistance and the evacuation protocol and thus realize one of Egypt's most eager aspirations — and to discuss the Sudan question *de novo* at a conference with ourselves and the Sudanese. To all these proposals I have received either an uncompromising negative or proposals which would involve my re-entering negotiations committed to the thesis that the right of the Sudanese to self-determination must be subject to permanent union between Egypt and the Sudan. I have even found myself accused of pursuing a policy of endeavoring to filch the Sudan from Egypt.

My hope is that broader and less stubborn counsels may come to prevail in Cairo, for it is evident that the interests of both countries call for a fresh treaty and would justify a further effort to reach agreement so as to enable the two countries to co-operate for their mutual interest and defense. It is unfortunate that in the negotiations His Majesty's Government have had to deal with a minority government. I stated to this House of Commons that the question of the government was a matter for the Egyptians themselves. If, however, we can deal with a more fully representative Egyptian Government and if our negotiations can thereby avoid being the subject of Egyptian party conflicts, there will be a much better chance of carrying them through to a successful conclusion in the right spirit. Meanwhile the Treaty of 1936 will be adhered to.

Statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. Clement Attlee (British Prime Minister) on March 11, 1947

The statement issued by the Egyptian Prime Minister on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations stated that the final breaking off of these negotiations might be attributed only to the inability of Egypt to obtain satisfaction on the following two essential points: (1) The evacuation of British troops from Egypt. This evacuation must be immediate, complete, and not conditioned by a treaty. (2) The maintenance of the unity of Egypt and the Sudan, self-government for the Sudanese, and the restoration to Egypt of her rights in the administration of the Sudan in order to further the preparation of the Sudanese for self-government.

This declaration can best be judged in the light of the agreements reached between Sidky Pasha and the Foreign Secretary in London last October. These agreements provided for mutual arrangements for defense, arrangements for evacuation, and for the Sudan. The agreements were initialled by the two statesmen in London *ad referendum* to their Governments. The Egyptian Government submitted them to the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies on November 26, 1946, and received a vote of confidence. Thereupon the Egyptian Government informed His Majesty's Government on December 1 that they were ready to sign the Treaty and the two Annexes dealing with evacuation and the Sudan. The Foreign Secretary in his statement in the House of Commons on January 27, made quite

clear the sole reason why the signature did not in fact take place, namely, the endeavor of the Egyptian Government to construe one phrase of the protocol on the Sudan as meaning that they could rely on the support of His Majesty's Government to deny to the Sudanese complete freedom of choice when the time came for them to choose their future status.

The British Government had already agreed, as part of the above arrangements, to the complete evacuation of British troops in Egypt by 1949. This is not an excessive period for the winding up of the immense commitments built up by the British Army in Egypt, which was its main base for the war in which British arms saved Egypt from being overrun by the Nazis.

As already indicated by the Foreign Secretary in this House, the British Government are also in favor of eventual self-government for the Sudanese, who, when the time comes for them to choose their future status would not be debarred from choosing complete independence or some form of association with Egypt or even complete union if they wished. It is not true, therefore, to say that "British policy is directed towards inciting the Sudanese to secede from Egypt."

The Egyptian statement also says that the Sudanese are a people of the same race, language, and religion as the Egyptians. I should point out that the Sudanese comprise many races and types, Nilotic, Hamitic and Negro besides Arabs. Furthermore, out of approximately seven million Sudanese, more than two and a half million are not Muslim nor Arabic-speaking.

It is also stated that the Sudanese will only be able to express their views freely when British troops have evacuated the Sudan. British troops, in common with Egyptian troops, are in the Sudan at the disposal of the Governor-General for the defense of that country. It is incorrect to say that the presence of either the British or the Egyptian troops makes it impossible for the Sudanese to express their views freely.

APPENDIX II

The following articles are reprinted, by permission, from *The Times* (London) of January 24 and 25, 1947.

FUTURE OF THE SUDAN

(From London *Times* Correspondent in the Sudan)

I. FOR AND AGAINST UNION WITH EGYPT

AIMS OF ASHIGGA AND UMMA

The future of the Sudanese depends on the outcome of the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, and representatives of Sudanese political parties are in London and Cairo urging their views. Broadly the issue is whether or not the Sudan shall be part of the Egyptian Kingdom. But this

is an over-simplification, and it would be misleading to divide the Sudanese into pro-Egyptian and anti-Egyptian without stating the considerations that influence them. The crux of the matter is the interpretation of Egyptian sovereignty in the light of Egyptian intentions, known or believed.

A Cairo periodical has summarized the case thus: in favor of unity with Egypt are "the enlightened classes opposed to reactionary imperialism, and the great number of the religious adherents of El Sayed Ali el Mirghani"; opposing unity are "the comparatively small number of the members of the family of Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, the supporters of the idea of Mahdism, mostly in the western provinces, and a group of opportunists who hope to secure material advantages as a result of the Sudan's separation from Egypt." This statement, with its meaningless injection of the words "reactionary imperialism," admits that not every Sudanese desires unity and fairly illustrates how badly the Egyptian public is informed about the Sudan. The ignorant reader would hardly infer that El Sayed Sir Ali el Mirghani, K.C.M.G., and El Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, K.B.E., are the heads of rival religious sects whose adherents include practically all the Sudanese Muslims.

A stay in the Sudan makes certain facts quickly clear. First, it is mistaken to think that all Sudanese favor union with Egypt. Secondly, not all those who oppose union are hostile to Egypt; but they object to any arrangement that would permit direct Egyptian political or other influence in the Sudan. Thirdly, by no means all those who now advocate union do so because they do not favor Sudanese independence. Fourthly, were it not for the rivalry between the followers of Sayed Sir Ali el Mirghani and those of the Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, and Mirghanist fear of a Mahdist régime, many more Sudanese would oppose union.

The Blood-Brothers

The two principal political parties in the Sudan are the Ashigga and the Umma. The Ashigga includes those who for any reason favor union with Egypt. The Umma stands for Sudanese independence and rejects Egyptian, British, or other sovereignty over the country. The politically conscious members of Ashigga and Umma are drawn from the newspaper-reading class and number only a few thousands out of a population of 7,000,000. The Ashigga does not appear to publish lists, but its membership is probably greater than that of the Umma, which claims a total of half a million members. There are other parties, but their combined weight is negligible. Many educated Sudanese, and the great tribal chiefs who represent the mass of the people, belong to no party.

Both Ashigga and Umma developed in the Sudan Graduates Congress, a body which was at first a cultural and social organization. Dissatisfied with the slow progress towards independence, the Congress found itself drawn to politics, and a split early occurred in its ranks. One section, probably two-thirds of the whole, considered that the best way to independence was through union with Egypt. Great Britain, the strong member of the condominium, would thus be got rid of, and it would then be easy to break the control of the weaker partner Egypt. In short, union with Egypt was not

to be the end, but a means towards independence. This section became the Ashigga, or Blood-brothers. Incidentally, the allusion is not to brotherhood with Egypt but the nickname given to the seven inseparable friends who were the original nucleus of the party.

The smaller Umma included those who believed that there was danger in the tactics of independence through union and preferred direct methods. Most unfortunately, these two small political parties soon became the spear-heads of larger religious rivalries. The fact that El Mahdi was looked on as leader of those Sudanese who desired complete independence, added to Mirghanist fear that El Mahdi had designs to become King of the Sudan, at once aligned the Mirghanists with the Ashigga. The division is not clearcut.

Some Mirghanists favor complete independence, though few or no Mahdists desire union. Mirghanist fear of Mahdism is real, and it is probable that, but for it, there would be practically no pro-Egyptian party in the Sudan. The Mirghanists, however, prefer the Egyptian to a Mahdist régime, for the ghosts of the Khalifa and of the great Emirs of Mahdism, Wad el Hilu, Wad el Negumi, Osman Digna, Ahmed Fadhil, haunt the councils of the Ashigga. Sayed Sir Ali el Mirghani is head of a great and influential family driven into exile by the Mahdists in 1885. He has always feared and resented the pretensions of Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, whom he regards as an upstart. However, although El Mirghani's name is commonly associated with the Ashigga, he has never consented to the association, much less come out in support of the party. The division between the two leaders is now deep, and there is danger of a split in the Sudan, the more deplorable because religious feeling accentuates political differences.

When negotiations for a revision of the 1936 treaty opened, a meeting of all the Sudanese political parties decided to send a delegation to Cairo to press the following demands: The establishment of a free Sudanese democratic Government in union with Egypt; that Government should define what form union should take; and an alliance should be made with Great Britain. In Cairo, however, the pro-Egyptian section accepted the Egyptian definition of union. Claiming with obvious inaccuracy to represent the whole Sudan, it remained in Cairo. The rest refused to abate the original demands and returned to Khartoum.

Some detail of the nature and aims of the Ashigga and Umma parties is necessary. The Ashigga, whose hard core is the Muwaladin, descendants of Egyptians who married Sudanese wives, and who have never lost their attachment for Egypt, dominates the Graduates Congress and claims to represent the whole Congress. It is difficult to ascertain exactly what the Ashigga wants. It has not yet thought out the full consequences of its attitude. But in general it seeks a form of union that would leave the Sudan in control of its internal affairs. Its slogan is one King, one army, one foreign policy; but the present Condominium Government should continue the training of Sudanese to take over the entire administration at an early date; and the limit of Egyptian sovereignty and safeguards against its abuse would have to be agreed to by the Egyptians before the formal affirmation of that sovereignty.

"Benefits" of Union

The party believes that a democratic Sudanese assembly should choose

its own Government and that the Egyptians should not have the power to reject this choice. It is not clear that it would welcome an Egyptian Viceroy, unless, perhaps, his powers were severely circumscribed. The Administration would be purely Sudanese, and only such Egyptian or other foreign officials as the Sudanese invited would be employed. In union with Egypt the Sudanese would be assured of a friend on their northern border. They would reap the benefit of Egyptian prestige, experience, and wealth. Young Sudanese would enjoy increased educational, economic, and other opportunity. And the resources of the Nile Valley would be coordinated in the best interests of the two countries. They seem not to be disturbed at the present state of Egypt, which, they say, is on the verge of reform.

Ashigga influence and supporters preponderate in the "Three Towns" of Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North, in the bigger towns generally, and in the east and north. It constitutes the "have not" party and tends to be supported by the frustrated and discontented. Few of its members hold the higher posts open to Sudanese. Many wishfully believe that union means enhanced prospects, but in justice it may be said that many are able men who for various reasons have not found an outlet for their talent. The president of the Ashigga is Ismail el Azhari, leader of the "Sudan Delegation" in Cairo. He is a secondary school teacher who resigned from Government service in 1946 and is described by his colleagues as unintelligent. The brains of the Ashigga are probably the brothers Mahmud el Fadhli, secretary of the Graduates Congress, and Yahya el Fadhli, secretary of the Ashigga.

Ashigga Propaganda

Ashigga propaganda openly expresses ability to prevent Egyptian interference in Sudanese internal affairs, and, less openly, Ashigga determination to throw off the connection should it prove onerous. It claims that British imperialism has deliberately retarded the educational and economic development of the Sudan, which, it says, has been governed solely in British imperial interests. It promises "true democracy" and progress to the people, and that the riches of Egypt will be at the service of the Sudan. It asserts that the British intend to detach the south and absorb it into the British Empire, and it alleges that the Government have promised to satisfy the ambitions of El Mahdi to be king in return for Mahdist support against Egypt, the dangers of Mahdism being vividly drawn. This assertion may simply and truthfully be described as nonsense, for the Sudan Government have neither the intention nor the power to make anyone king of the Sudan. The Ashigga calls the Umma and the Mahdists feudalistic and capitalistic. It boycotts the Advisory Council because it considers it unrepresentative, impotent, and too dependent on the Governor-General.

The Umma Party is the spearhead of those Sudanese who favor complete independence. It differs basically from the Ashigga in that it trusts neither Egyptian assurance nor Ashigga ability to limit the Egyptian connection or break it should it prove oppressive. The Umma is neither a British creation nor even pro-British, though like the Ashigga it has some pro-British members. Indeed, it bitterly asks if the Sudan is not being sold by the British in order to buy Egyptian support. Nor is it necessarily anti-Egyptian. Some

of its members are pro-Egyptian and most of them admit the advantages of a connection and the existence of legitimate Egyptian interests in the Sudan, such as security and a share in the Nile water. But they do not trust the Egyptians and, therefore, reject Egyptian sovereignty. Some of them would probably accept it if it were as innocuous as the British sovereignty in, say, Australia, but they believe such a relationship impossible.

2. FEARS AMONG THE MAHDI'S FOLLOWERS

THE CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE

Although the rank and file of educated Sudanese are in the Ashigga, the party that favors union with Egypt, it is generally conceded that the Umma, the party that stands for independence, has the support of the majority of the really outstanding men, including those filling the higher posts open to Sudanese in the Administration. The Umma is to this extent the "have" party, and the Ashigga asserts that these higher officials have been promoted because they are pro-British and anti-Egyptian. This charge is ridiculous; and if the unpleasant adjective "opportunist" must be applied it should rather be to those who support the pro-Egyptian party in the hopes of obtaining the posts now held by their political opponents.

The stronghold of the Umma supporters is in the west, among the great cattle-raising Baggara tribes of Southern Darfur and Kordofan, who are all followers of the Mahdi. They wish the condominium to continue until the Sudanese are fit for self-determination, but not a moment longer. They consider that progress towards self-determination could and must be greatly speeded. They have not yet thought out the form of an independent Sudan and are inclined to leave it to be decided by the next generation in the light of developments. The more thoughtful oppose a Sudanese monarchy, in this generation at least, for they fear it would precipitate civil war. Equally, they claim that an attempt to impose Egyptian sovereignty, for which they have neither respect nor loyalty, would have the same result.

Bitter Memories

The Umma opposes that sovereignty for several reasons, most of which would, of course, disappear if it were certain that it would be purely nominal. It points out that sovereignty in the east is very different from sovereignty in the British Empire. The word "sovereignty" (*seyada*) is especially resented, for its meaning is "mastery" and recalls the bitter days when the Sudanese were mostly slaves. Umma supporters believe that Egyptian authority would be arbitrary and capricious, and recall their experience of Egyptian officialdom in the country between 1900 and 1924. They argue that the Sudanese have the same right as any other nation to independence and to decide what connection, if any, they will have with another Power; and they say that it would be a poor reward if the Sudanese, who fought in Italian East Africa, North Africa, and other theaters, and placed all their resources at British disposal, were to be put under the Egyptians, who fought nowhere and made great riches out of the war.

They believe that if Egyptian sovereignty is affirmed the Egyptians will attempt to exploit the country, taking the best posts and developing the Nile waters and the Government lands exclusively in the Egyptian interest. They claim that the Egyptians would dump their surplus population upon the Sudan — though many would welcome Egyptian immigration under Sudanese control. They deride assurances from Cairo that every Sudanese will have equality of opportunity with any Egyptian, and ask how that could be when most Egyptians have no chance of being anything more than virtual serfs. They believe that Egyptian capitalism would soon bring the “Pasha” system and a widening of the now small gap between the ruling class and the *fellahin*. The condition of the Egyptian *fellahin* is always before their eyes. They demand a democratic electoral system, though it is probable that most of their leaders regard patriarchalism as the ideal government for the Sudanese. They would let the “clever ones” run the machinery of government, while retaining power in the hands of the great sheikhs.

Pressure from Cairo

The Egyptians appear not to realize that the undoubted advantages of unity of the Nile Valley are offset in the Sudan by other factors. These factors would hardly matter were it not for the widespread belief that Egyptian sovereignty would, in spite of assurances, mean direct interference. The memory of Egyptian misrule is revived continually by the overbearing behavior of individual Egyptians towards the Sudanese, the assumption of racial superiority being particularly galling.

Traveled Sudanese have seen the working of the Egyptian administrative machine, the condition of the Egyptian masses, and the state of Egyptian politics. The accounts they have brought back have not increased the desire for any extension of Egyptian influence. Particularly strong feeling arises from the remembrance that when the Italians invaded this country the Cairo Government refused to declare war and the Egyptian troops in Khartoum even refused to lend the Sudanese a couple of machine guns for use against raiding Italian aircraft. An earlier memory, strong among Sudanese officers, is that when in 1924 the preconcerted Egyptian-Sudanese mutiny broke out in Khartoum the Egyptians withdrew without firing a shot while the Sudanese mutineers fought the British to the death.

The campaign of personal abuse carried on by Egyptian politicians and press against Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi and Sir Hubert Huddleston has caused great anger. The Sudanese strongly resent the description of the Mahdi as “bought by the British”, the demand that he be treated and punished as a rebel, and offensive caricatures depicting him as a half-naked savage. Minor irritations include the flood prevention measures in the exceptionally high Nile of 1946, when the destruction of much property led Sudanese to assert that Egypt had been saved at their expense. While Egyptian contributions to Sudanese welfare, such as mosques and schools and the gift of scholarships, are hailed by the Ashigga as evidence of the benefits of union, by the Umma they are regarded as bait to delude the Sudanese. Finally, the decision of the Arab League to support the Egyptian case, in spite of alleged promises that the League would never countenance the subjection of Arabs to other Arabs, has greatly shocked many people here.

There is much truth in Egyptian allegations that there has been discrimination against them by the Sudan Administration. Egyptian propaganda is restricted only by the law of libel and subversion, but Egyptian political propagandists do not find it easy to procure visas for the Sudan. Even if the quality of Egyptian applicants for posts in the Administration has been poor, there has certainly been prejudice against them, a prejudice shared, however, by the Sudanese, who feel that they and not foreigners should fill the posts in their own country. The allegation that Muslim missions are excluded from the south is technically unfounded, but the regulations do in effect exclude any non-Christian mission. On the other hand, no missions are allowed north of the tenth parallel. Egyptian assertions that the British officials here influenced the people against Egypt occasionally had some basis; but the allegation that it is the policy of the Administration to encourage separation from Egypt is categorically untrue. Its policy is rigidly neutral, and it impresses upon the Sudanese the need for friendship with Egypt.

But as the first duty of the Government, as laid down by treaty, is the welfare of the Sudanese people, it is hardly to be expected that individual officers can refrain entirely from contrasting Sudanese administrative and other standards with Egyptian standards. The general attitude of the Administration is that of a mother who believes that her child is not ready to leave the maternal apron-strings. It is clear that the Egyptians are ill-informed on the Sudan. They are accustomed to take at their face value the reports of pro-Egyptian Sudanese and to disbelieve anything unfavorable to their own case.

These are the Sudanese and Egyptian aspects of the problem, but the future of the Sudan requires mention of other vital factors. The common-sense advantages of close union with Egypt are widely admitted, but the effects of union are not always given much thought. The Sudan is a poor country. There is no evidence to support the common belief in Cairo that the Sudan has great untapped sources of wealth that the British wish to conceal. The country is agricultural and pastoral. If even the present standards of the people are to be maintained the Administration must be scrupulously honest, efficient, and imbued with a strong sense of the public well-being. Margins are slender, and any perceptible lowering of the moral or professional standards of Sudanese Government servants would have serious repercussions throughout the country.

Common Interests

If the resources of the Nile Valley are to be developed in the best interests of both countries a high state of public security is essential. At present "an Egyptian irrigation official could walk in perfect safety from Wadi Halfa to Juba with no more escort than one policeman to carry his umbrella." Efficiency and security are the keystones of the Nile Valley structure. The only threat to security in over 20 years has resulted from offensive Egyptian public attacks on the Mahdi, whose followers are the most fanatical and war-like of the Sudanese and who strongly object to the insults leveled against their leader. Until the idea of Egyptian sovereignty came to the fore perhaps 5 per

cent of the Sudanese were politically conscious, and most of these were townsmen. But Ismail Sidky Pasha's mention of *seyada* and Nokrashy Pasha's affirmation of "permanent unity" awakened the tribes to a realization that their future was in the balance, and there was a stirring throughout the land.

Rumors that the Condominium Government was finishing, and the possibility of a Mahdist rising, seriously alarmed the stable elements. A scuffle between Mahdist and Mirghanist supporters in Khartoum last October caused real anxiety in a country that had known no internal troubles since 1924. The revulsion has been against the Egyptians and has enhanced the popular belief that nothing must be done hastily to weaken an Administration which at least guarantees security and protection from exploitation and assures every man his land or his grazing rights.

What of the future? If there be such a person as an "average Sudanese," he probably thinks that the preparation of the Sudanese for self-government must be greatly accelerated, and when it has been achieved the Sudanese will consider with whom, if anyone, they will link themselves; but the choice must be theirs. The value of the Egyptian connection is obvious, and there is no dislike for the Egyptian people, nor reason for any, for the two peoples have much in common. The worst enemies of the Egyptian cause are the Egyptian press and certain Egyptian politicians who have aroused genuine Sudanese fears that *seyada* means Egyptian domination.

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